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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF GRECO-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER        
1999: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
                                             Tetik, Gözde 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nil Seda Şatana 
  December 2007 
 
Greek-Turkish relations used to follow a fluctuating trend. The relationship is 
a cycle of conflict and cooperation. Up to now, Greece and Turkey attempted to 
ameliorate their relations several times. However, these attempts occasionally failed 
due to lack of adequate and sufficient willingness of both parties. There is a growing 
literature on how this cyclical trend changed since 1999. Different from the previous 
attempts, current transformation in relations seems to be the reflection of the 
willingness of political elites, military and the civilians in both Turkey and Greece. 
This factor differentiates this current thaw in two countries’ relations from the 
previous ones.  
This thesis mainly aims to examine whether there is empirical evidence of a 
transformation in Greco-Turkish relations, notably in military and economic aspects. 
The main findings show that Greece and Turkey do indeed experience a 
transformation in their military and economic relations. Regarding economic 
relations, the two states experience a vivacity concerning major economic activities 
such as trade, investment and tourism. Meanwhile, their military relations, apart from 
the occasional tensions triggered by territorial and airspace violations, follow a 
progressive trend since 1999. The hostility level between the two countries has 
decreased and military staffs of two countries have more dialogue than in previous 
decades. To sum up, findings of this thesis prove that since 1999 Greco-Turkish 
relations have experienced an affirmative transformation with regard to economic 
and military aspects. 
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ÖZET 
 
1999 YILINDAN BU YANA TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİNDEKİ 
DEĞİŞİMLER: ASKERİ VE EKONOMİK GELİŞMELER 
Tetik, Gözde 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doc. Dr. Nil Seda Şatana 
Aralık 2007 
 
Türk-Yunan ilişkileri inişli çıkışlı bir geçmişe sahiptir. İki ülke ilişkileri savaş 
ve barıştan oluşan bir çember gibidir. Şu ana kadar, iki ülkenin de, birçok kere, 
ilişkilerini düzeltme çabaları olmuştur ancak bu çabalar, iki tarafın isteksiz tavırları 
nedeniyle, başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Yunanistan-Türkiye ilişkilerinin değişmeye 
başladığına dair gelişen bir literatür iniş çıkışlarla karakterize olmuş çemberin 
kırılmaya başladığına işaret etmektedir. Öncekilerden farklı olarak, bugünkü uzlaşma 
dönemi siyasi sınıfın, halkın ve askerlerin rızasının ve isteğinin bir yansımasıdır. Bu 
özellik, bugünkü uzlaşmayı bir öncekilerden ayırmaktadır.  
Bu tezin başlıca amacı Türkiye ve Yunanistan ilişkilerinde, özellikle askeri ve 
ekonomik açıdan, bir değişim olup olmadığını araştırmaktır ve bulgular 
göstermektedir ki Türkiye ve Yunanistan ilişkileri askeri ve ekonomik açıdan bir 
değişim göstermektedir. Ekonomik ilişkilere bakıldığında iki ülke arasındaki temel 
ekonomik aktivitelerde bir canlılık gözlemlenmektedir. Askeri ilişkilerine 
bakıldığında ise ‘Ege’ deki tansiyona rağmen, iki ülke, geçmiş yıllara göre, bir 
ilerleme kaydetmiştir; 1999’dan bu yana çatışmalarda bir azalma olmuş ve  askeri 
diyalogun yoğunluğu artmıştır. Özetle, bu tezin bulguları Türkiye ve Yunanistan  
ilişkilerinin iyi yönde bir değişim gösterdiğine dair umut verici kanıtlardır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Greek-Turkish relations have a dynamic character. The two countries have, so 
far, experienced several fluctuations in their relations between cooperation and 
conflict. Therefore, the bilateral relations have been characterized with various 
transformation periods. The current Greco-Turkish relations, which are the focus of 
this thesis, follow a trend shifting from competitive to cooperative attitudes.  
The current transformation period in the two countries’ relations beginning 
from 1999 is arguably different from the previous transformation attempts (Oğuzlu, 
2004a: 94; Oğuzlu, 2004b: 340; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 1). The significant 
difference appears to be the dramatic increase in political, military, and, civilian 
dialogue. Through multiple channels, Greece and Turkey have entered a dialogue for 
better relations and sustainable cooperation. They entered a dialogue period triggered 
by either notion of leaders, regional developments or the European Union (EU), 
which led the two countries to cooperate gradually. While their initial focus has been 
on issues of low-politics, Greece and Turkey have not overlooked the issues 
regarding high-politics. Besides achievement of cooperation on issues such as trade, 
investment, tourism, terrorism, culture and others, Greece and Turkey began to 
communicate on main disputes such as the achievement of an Aegean Dialogue 
(Oğuzlu, 2004a: 95; Aksu, 2004: 31-109; Heraclides, 2002: 23; Öniş and Yılmaz, 
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2007: 9). 
However, besides the dialogue achieved at governmental and non-
governmental levels, the literature on Greco-Turkish relations generally agrees that 
this recent thaw in bilateral relations is fragile (Siegl, 2002: 50; Oğuzlu, 2004a: 93; 
Öniş, 2001: 31-45; Snyder, 2004: 11; Couloumbis, 1999: 24-48; Ifantis, 2005: 379-
394). The major disputes such as the Aegean conflict and the Cyprus issue, and 
tactical intentions with respect to relations with the European Union are the main 
reasons of the sensitivity in relations between the two countries. On the other hand, 
some scholars are suspicious about the reliability of Greco-Turkish rapprochement 
because of the steady levels of military spending of both states. Considering the ever-
increasing level of military expenditures, Kollias (2005) and Kollias and Paleologou 
(2003) suggest that Greece and Turkey still see each other as a threat to regional 
security, ignoring other more immediate and possible concerns for security.  
Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to examine whether there is indeed 
such a changing pattern in Greco-Turkish relations, particularly focusing on the 
period after 1999. Thus, the major contribution of this thesis to the international 
relations literature is to empirically test the argument of transformation in the last 
decade by focusing on economic and military aspects of the relations.  
The time period chosen for the research is after 1999 since this is the year 
commonly accepted as the beginning of the transformation in Greco-Turkish 
relations due to a number of striking events that took place in 1999. Nevertheless, 
several years before 1999 are also analyzed to make comparisons.  
The literature review chapter of this thesis consists of historical background 
and a section that explains the effect of EU on bilateral relations of Greece and 
Turkey. The historical section analyzes developments in the two countries’ relations 
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and the latter examines the role of the European Union concerning these 
developments. To that end, I have utilized secondary sources. Since this new era in 
Greek-Turkish relations is an often-studied case attracting a great deal of scholarly 
attention, resources are abundant. Books, academic articles, conference papers, 
surveys and the media are the secondary resources used in the literature review 
chapter of the thesis. 
In the empirical analysis chapter, a quantitative data set is analyzed and the 
findings are supported with news coverage from several Turkish newspapers. The 
chapter consists of two sections, as I believe that cooperation in bilateral relations of 
the two countries can be observed in military and economic areas. The data on 
military relations are available at the Correlates of War (COW) project web site 
(Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004: 133-154). Different from the literature, I examine 
the bilateral hostility levels of both Greece and Turkey between the years of 1945 
and 2001. For that end, I utilize the variable of hostility level from the Correlates of 
War Project trying to find out the changes in hostile actions of Greece and Turkey 
against each other.  
In order to follow the trend in economic relations between the two countries, I 
use the indicators of bilateral trade, investment, and tourist exchange, which are 
major economic activity indicators of any two states. In that section, I have utilized 
data, mainly gathered from the official web sites of the treasury, and State Institute of 
Statistics, which are comprehensive resources. Moreover, I have also made use of 
other Internet sources such as the General Chief of Staff, Foreign Ministry and the 
European Union. 
It should also be highlighted that newspapers are among the important 
sources of the empirical chapter. During my research, I utilized the archives of three 
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Turkish newspapers; Hürriyet, Milliyet, and Radikal by which I could trace daily 
news covering relations between Greece and Turkey. Finally, I should note that I 
refrain from any provocative data and resources.  
 Following the literature review and the empirical analyses, I present my 
concluding remarks and an overview of the findings that confirm the intuitions of the 
literature. Consequently, the thesis is finalized with an emphasis on how my analysis 
on current transformation in Greek-Turkish relations contributes to the existing 
literature on Greco-Turkish relations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. History of Greek-Turkish Relations 
 
The history of Greek-Turkish relations is full of fluctuations. The bilateral 
relations have gone through a tension-negotiation-tension cycle (Kollias, 2005; 
Coufoudakis, 1991: 40-55; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 1). Leaving the Cyprus issue 
aside, territorial waters, continental shelf, and air-space issues over the Aegean, 
many times, led the two countries to brink of war (Siegl, 2002: 41). 
Aegean disputes, the Cyprus issue, the status of ethnic minorities in Western 
Trace, and Greek official action against Turkey within the EU are the issues that 
soured the two countries’ bilateral relations over time. Of these four issues, the latter 
two have been resolved. There have been improved governmental relations about the 
treatment of minorities in Turkey and Greece over the last few years (Çarkoğlu and  
Kirişci, 2003: 140). Meanwhile, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece did not use 
its veto right against Turkey, which shows a change in its attitude about EU-Turkish 
relations and Greece continues to support Turkish membership to the EU. However, 
the first two issues remain unsolved and still show the potential to deteriorate 
bilateral relations (Evin, 2004: 10).  
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Despite these problems, Greece and Turkey, occasionally attempted to 
ameliorate their relations. Historically, they have experienced three phases of 
rapprochement (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 1). First one was in 1930 when Atatürk and 
the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos signed a “Friendship Agreement”. 
Improvement of the relations continued until mid-1950s. Common membership to 
NATO in 1952 and the Balkan Pact in 1953 contributed to the two countries’ 
friendship efforts (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 29).  However, beginning from 1955, the détente 
in bilateral relations began to deteriorate due to the Cyprus issue and the minority 
problems (Coufoudakis, 1991: 40-55). Greek public opinion forced the Greek 
government to support enosis1 of Greek Cypriots while the Turkish government 
backed the struggle of Turkish Cypriots against enosis (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 29).  
In 1974, upon the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, bilateral relations hit the 
bottom. Following Turkey’s intervention, emerging foreign policy consensus in 
Greece was that the major threat to Greece was from Turkey, not from the 
communist Soviet Union (Coufoudakis, 1991: 40-55). Since 1974, the cycle of 
confrontation and negotiation between the two countries has been a well-known 
trend. This cycle has repeated on issues dividing the two countries (Coufoudakis, 
1991: 40-55). In 1976, 1987 and 1996 Greece and Turkey came dangerously close to 
war (Rumelili; 2004a: 3). 
The problem in 1976 was the continental shelf dispute. When Greece 
announced oil and natural gas discoveries in the area and claimed rights on the 
continental shelf in the Aegean, the Turkish government assumed the issue as a fait 
accompli (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 34). Meanwhile, talks between Greek and Turkish 
governments did not bring any solution to the issue and the Greek claim for ten miles 
                     
1
 Enosis  refers to the movement of the Greek-Cypriot population to unite  the island of Cyprus with 
the Greece,  which they considered as their motherland 
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of air space and the Turkish objection to it have since remained as one of the core 
problems between the two countries (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 35). 
The continental shelf issue again led to the 1987 incident that brought the two 
countries to the brink of war. When the Greek government attempted to nationalize 
the North Aegean Petroleum Consortium, which received drilling permission in the 
northern Aegean, Turkey objected to the attempt (Bölükbaşı, 1992: 37). Tension 
between Greece and Turkey diminished, unexpectedly, and ended in the Davos 
Summit in 1988. 
 Davos Process of 1988 has been assumed as the beginning of the second 
rapprochement period in Greco-Turkish relations (Öniş, and Yılmaz, 2007: 2). Davos 
put an end to an era of confrontation and paved the way to an era of détente. 
Significant efforts were pursued by both sides in order to understand each other’s 
viewpoint, which seemed to be a breakthrough in the Greek-Turkish relations 
(Birand, 1991: 27-39). The goal was to resume bilateral dialogue and prevent a 
possible war between the two countries (Sezer, 1991: 109-125). However, the 
process did not offer solution to the serious problems between the two countries; and 
thus did not last long (Öniş, and Yılmaz, 2007: 2). 
The year 1989 witnessed important elections in Greece and Turkey. Because 
of the need to be sensitive to their constituency, who were not as committed as they 
were to a Greco-Turkish rapprochement, Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers’ 
freedom of maneuver was restricted (Clogg, 1991: 23). They faced severe attacks 
from the opposition to abandon their pacific policies towards one another (Pridham, 
1991; Coufoudakis, 1991: 40-55; Kirişci and Çarkoğlu, 2003). This caused a 
deadlock in the rapprochement process. It was clear that public opinion in the two 
countries did not show any commitment to the rapprochement (Clogg, 1991: 23, 
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Birand, 1991: 16).  Therefore, the second thaw collapsed by the end of 1989 due to 
reasons such as Andreas Papandreou’s lack of willingness, political scandals 
following his electoral defeat, Özal’s isolation after the electoral setbacks, and lastly 
rejection of Turkish membership application by the European Community (EC) in 
December 1989 (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 2). 
1990’s hosted several crises between Greece and Turkey. The first and the 
most serious crisis of the decade took place in 1996 about the legal status of the islets 
in the Aegean Sea; Imia-Kardak. This crisis was the third incident that almost 
resulted in war (Hickok, 1998: 118-136). 
 The second crisis broke out when the Greek government announced its 
intention to bring S-300 missiles from Russia to Cyprus in 1997. Turkey assumed 
this announcement as a threat to its national security. Hence, both Turkey and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared that they would strike at missiles if 
they were located in Cyprus. Eventually, tension diminished following the decision 
of Greece to locate missiles in Crete rather than Cyprus (Yiallourides, 2001, in 
Oğuzlu, 2004b: 347).  
The last crisis took place in 1999 following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan 
who was the leader of a terrorist organization, Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). 
Alleged Greek involvement in the escape of Öcalan to Kenya was assumed by 
Turkey as a direct interference of Greece in Turkey’s domestic politics (Öniş, 2001: 
31-45). This crisis was partially solved soon after the resignation of the foreign 
minister Teodoros Pangolos from the Cabinet (Prusher, 1999 in Oğuzlu, 2004b: 347). 
The cabinet eliminated this hardliner Foreign Minister and replaced him with George 
Papandreou who appeared as a conciliator between Greece and Turkey (Ayman, 
2000: 56-60).   
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To sum up, at the beginning of 1999, Greek-Turkish relations were 
experiencing a bottom low. The following section discusses how the relation 
improved leading to cooperation between the two states since then, at least, 
occasionally.  
 
 
2.1.1. Transformation of Relations Beginning From 1999 
 
 The last quarter of 1990s was a turning point in Greco-Turkish relations. 
Despite the series of tensions, which were faced in a short time period, a dialogue 
and cooperation process could be initiated (Aksu, 2004: 41). While on one hand 
confidence building measures (CBMs) were brought to life, on the other, cooperation 
on low-politics issues was initiated and discussion of basic conflict issues began 
(Aksu, 2004: 41). 
In the literature, four instances are deemed to play a significant role in the 
transformation of Greco-Turkish relations. The first one is the Öcalan Crisis. The 
argument of the literature is that transformation in the two countries’ relations 
appeared before 1999, following the capture of Öcalan. The main logic of this 
argument is that removal of the hardliner Theodoros Pangolos from the cabinet and 
replacement of him by moderate George Papanreou opened the way for more 
dialogue between Greece and Turkey (Evin, 2005: 395-404; Aksu, 2004: 31-109; 
Öniş, 2001: 31-45; Öniş, 2002: 1-24). Greek involvement in the Öcalan affair 
embarrassed the Greek government and forced it to defuse this undesired reputation 
(Nachmani, 2001). To that end, in order to mitigate its bad reputation in the eyes of 
the West, notably the EU, Greece preferred to ameliorate its relations with Turkey. 
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Therefore, this approach would argue that dialogue between the two countries began 
prior to the earthquake incidents, which will be discussed below. The earthquakes 
both countries experienced just accelerated the thaw and moved the dialogue to a 
civilian level (Bilgiç and Karatzas, 2004: 2; Evin, 2004: 4-20). 
The second incident is the Kosovo Crisis, which arose in the beginning of 
1990s, creating a thaw in relations between Greece and Turkey. Instability in South-
East Europe highlighted the need for an end to antagonism between the two pivotal 
states of the region (Triantaphyllou and Keridis, 2001; Nachmani; 2001). This was 
considered as a good opportunity for Greece to change its image in the eyes of the 
West after the Öcalan stigma (Heraclides, 2002: 21). It is important that, in the wake 
of the crisis, foreign ministers of the two sides agreed to initiate efforts to ameliorate 
bilateral relations (Heraclides, 2002: 22).  
 The third striking event is the earthquakes that took place in 1999, which is 
assumed to be the beginning of “Seismic Diplomacy” in Greek-Turkish relations 
(Akiman, 2002: 23).  Earthquakes, one after another, in both Turkey and Greece 
were considered as incidents that brought Greece and Turkey together and that led to 
a new era in Greco-Turkish relations (Siegl, 2002: 44; Snyder, 2004: 2; Nachmani, 
2001). It was not only a revival of formal relations, but also the beginning of a 
civilian one. These tragic events prompted mutual solidarity and provision of rapid 
aid, which was appreciated by the civilians of both countries (Ayman, 2000: 56-60; 
Akiman, 2002: 22-32). Until these earthquakes, the civilians in both sides used to 
show little interest in each other. There was widespread ignorance of each other’s 
history, language and culture (Heraclides, 2002: 28). These humanitarian initiatives 
broke down the stereotypes of the two countries’ citizens for one another, and proved 
that the two nations still had peace incentives toward each other (Aksu, 2004: 41).  
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The last incident accelerating the transformation in Greco-Turkish relations 
was the 1999 Helsinki Summit (Evin, 2005: 395–404). For the first time in many 
years, there appeared optimism in the Greece-Turkey-EU triangle (Bilgiç and 
Karatzas, 2004: 3).  Political course of the two countries’ relations gathered 
momentum with the Helsinki Summit (Siegl, 2002: 44). Greece abandoned its rigid 
veto policy and decided to stop its objections to the Turkish membership to the EU. 
The Helsinki Summit presumably signaled that Greece is no longer a threat to the 
Turkish-EU relations. It also indicated that Greek stance vis-à-vis Turkey has 
changed from a strategy of conditional sanctions to conditional rewards 
(Couloumbis, 1999: 24-48).   
 These incidents arguably paved the way for more collaboration and gradually 
got the two states closer.  In addition, this new era in Greco-Turkish relations 
differentiates itself from the previous attempts with regard to the support it got from 
multiple channels (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 94; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 1). 
 In the previous years, regarding the Aegean disputes, the majority of Turks 
and Greeks discouraged the efforts of their governments for any concession or 
solution. Thus, official relations were distant until 1999. However, currently, 
compared with the previous years, not only civilian but also state to state level 
dialogue is considerable (Heraclides, 2002: 19). These traits differentiate the current 
thaw from the previous ones. Oğuzlu (2004a: 93; 2004b: 337) accounts for other 
factors, which allow this current Greek-Turkish thaw. These are strong public 
support, political leaders’ willingness to further reconciliation processes, the role of 
business elites in encouraging political leaders, and the changing Greek perspective 
favoring better Turkish-EU relations, which were absent in the previous 
rapprochement period.  
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Since 1999, intergovernmental dialogue has been fruitful and in 2000, CBMs 
turned into agreements aiming to foster common efforts of cooperation between 
Greece and Turkey (Aksu, 2004: 61). Thus, the two countries’ governments signed 
agreements on issues of terrorism, immigration, energy, transportation, environment, 
tourism, illegal drug traffic, fisheries, education, and sports.2 With these bilateral 
agreements, Greece and Turkey, for the first time, have a comprehensive legal 
framework on low politics issues (Heraclides, 2002: 23). 
 Further collaboration has been supported by the establishment of a Task 
Force on cooperation aiming to provide expertise on matters related to the EU such 
as customs, financial issues, judicial issues, agricultural matters, police cooperation 
etc (Heraclides, 2002: 24). This framework brought Greek and Turkish experts 
together from various fields, such as judges, police officers, civil servants and so on.  
Besides collaboration in these areas of low politics, Greece and Turkey 
cooperated on issues of high politics at the governmental level as well. Since 2002, 
diplomats from the two countries came together in order to discuss the main disputes 
and how to handle them, and they agreed to form a group of experts in order to 
exchange ideas regarding the ongoing bilateral disputes (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 95). 
As far as the history of economic relations is concerned, analyses of the 
history of the two countries’ economic relations after 1999 utilize three indicators: 
trade, investment, and tourism (Aksu, 2004: 31-109; Öniş and Yılmaz; 2007: 1-36). 
A developing trend in economic relations is a common observation. Notably, the 
trade volume has been consistently on the rise (Öniş and Yılmaz; 2007: 10). Process 
in the other two economic activities is also better compared to the period before 
1999; however, it remains limited considering two random neighboring states (Aksu, 
                     
2
 For more detailed information about the agreements, see international agreements section at  the 
official web site of the Turkish Foreign Ministry at http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
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2004: 31-109). Moreover, as part of regional collaboration, it is worth mentioning 
that they agreed to build a cross-border pipeline carrying natural gas from Central 
Asia to Western Europe (Hope, 2002: 44-47). Therefore, the literature, analyzing 
economic relations, reaches a conclusion that recent Greek-Turkish economic 
relations are affirmative enough to say that there has been an economic improvement 
between Greece and Turkey compared to previous years.3 
 Non-governmental organizations and business people have a significant role 
in this transformation of Greek-Turkish economic relations (Siegl, 2002: 47). Since 
1999, there has been an increase in business contacts between the two countries. 
Starting from the second half of 1999, the joint business councils in each country 
became more active by organizing trade fairs, business meetings, and by providing 
support for political rapprochement (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 3). 
 With regard to the security issues, one of the major developments is that 
Greece and Turkey agreed to eliminate landmines on their common borders and 
decided to downsize their military spending (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 98).  
All of these developments support the idea that Greece and Turkey began 
cooperating on issues of low politics. As the two countries are more connected, 
politicians get more motivated for better relations and this collaboration prepared the 
structure for cooperation on political and security issues. Notably, considering the 
regional collaboration projects as natural gas pipeline and Balkan Cultures Corridor, 
I believe that working together for a common good is likely to get Greece and 
Turkey closer, and more connected in the future.   
 
 
                     
3
 In my analysis in the following empirical chapter, I utilize the same indicators since I agree that 
these are the major economic activities between any two states. However, I consider the GNP of each 
year and share of each indicator within total in order to reach results that are more reliable.  
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Consequently, the literature suggests that since the end of the 1990s bilateral 
relations between the two countries exhibited sound developments (Aksu, 2004: 31-
109; Heraclides, 2002: 17-32; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2007: 1-31). Today, crisis due to 
misunderstandings are less likely to happen and are avoidable. Tension is no more 
desirable neither by governments nor by civilians of the two countries (Heraclides, 
2002: 26).  
Besides the developments in Greco-Turkish relations that the literature, 
covered so far, the literature generally agrees that this transformation of bilateral 
relations between Greece and Turkey is fragile due to the unsolved disputes between 
the two countries (Siegl, 2002: 50; Oğuzlu, 2004a; Öniş, 2001: 31-45; Snyder, 2004: 
11; Couloumbis, 1999: 24-48; Ifantis, 2005: 379-394). Unless the bilateral disputes 
between Greece and Turkey are solved, the two countries cannot reach a lasting and 
sound peace since these disputes may erupt again.  
Since 1999, sixteen agreements have been signed between the two countries. 
However, these agreements are on peripheral issues like economics, environment, 
terrorism, illegal immigration and so forth (Snyder, 2004: 4).  Greece and Turkey 
preferred to extend dialogue on issues of low-politics (Bilgiç and Karatzas, 2004: 5).  
However, main political problems between the two countries, like the Aegean and 
Cyprus issues, have not been solved. Thus, the recent rapprochement has not yet 
resulted in major progress with respect to the grand disputes (Bilgiç and Karatzas, 
2004: 7) 
Moreover, there are scholars who completely disagree that there is a 
transformation in Greek-Turkish relations. Kollias (2002: 321-328), Kollias and 
Paleologou (2003: 437–445) claim that Greece and Turkey still perceive each other 
as a threat to each other’s security. Accordingly, a transformation in the relations is 
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only wishful thinking.  
 This counter literature, which does not believe in a transformation in Greek-
Turkish relations, mostly focuses on the military spending of the two countries. 
Greece and Turkey still allocate substantial parts of their national income to defense 
(Kollias, 2002: 321). Even after the end of a bipolar world dominated by the 
hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union, the military expenditures of 
Greece and Turkey continued to grow. Despite the recent improvements in Greek-
Turkish bilateral relations, this trend has not resulted in any reduction in defense 
expenditures (Kollias, 2005: 104). Greece and Turkey are the only two NATO 
countries that have increased military expenditures in the post-Cold War era (Öniş, 
2007: 4).  
The analysis of the reasons behind the increasing Greek and Turkish military 
expenditures shows that the two states are not arming totally independent of each 
other and the large and extensive modernization programs of their respective armed 
forces undertaken in recent years are, to some extent, interdependent (Kollias, 2005; 
Kollias and Paleologou, 2003: 437–445). However, even though they are not arming 
independent of each other, there are many other variables that can explain the 
increase in defense expenditures, such as alliances, external and internal security 
concerns, military elites, domestic policy priorities and economic constrains (Kollias, 
2002: 321; Günlük-Şeneşen, 2005). 
Both countries are vulnerable to external threats and instabilities in their 
regions. Greece perceives threats from the Balkans and Turkey; and Turkey feels 
threatened by Greece, the Caucasus, and the Middle East (Anastasakis, 2005: 49). 
Therefore, Greece and Turkey are not the only threats for each other. Christos 
Kollias (2005: 103) counts some of these factors and introduces the concept of 
  
16 
“external noise.” He presents factors such as the Kurdish problem, fiscal constraints, 
alliance commitments, defense industry, regional disputes, domestic political 
priorities, and so forth. Kollias (2005: 103) claims that ignoring these variables may 
cause difficulties in establishing a causal connection between the two countries’ 
defense expenditures. 
I argue that the presence of other factors affecting military spending of both 
countries makes the argument of the first strand of the literature discussed earlier 
more plausible. In addition, since it can be caused by various factors, military 
expenditure alone is not a good indicator to predict if a transformation is taking place 
between the two countries. Thus, following the first strand of the literature, I do not 
include military expenditures in my empirical analysis. Instead, I analyze changes in 
the hostility levels of the two countries during the bilateral disputes between 1945 
and 2001. 
The transformation, as previously mentioned, is fragile (Siegl, 2002: 50; 
Oğuzlu, 2004a: 93; Öniş, 2001: 31-45; Snyder, 2004: 11; Couloumbis, 1999: 24-48; 
Ifantis, 2005: 379-394). The other argument, which assumes this logic, argues that 
Greece and Turkey have instrumental reasons for rapprochement. The ones, who 
advocate this argument, mostly focus on the EU factor. The main assumption is that 
Turkey’s accession efforts to the EU and the Greek efforts to catch up with the latest 
stage of the EU integration lead to pacific bilateral relations (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 102; 
Oğuzlu, 2004b: 337). They both accommodate each other in order to continue their 
path within the EU structure. Thus, this thaw is also the result of tactical policies of 
the two countries’ governments. The next section analyzes the Greece-Turkey-EU 
triangle in order to better comprehend the dynamics of cooperation between Turkey 
and Greece. 
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2.2. EU & Greek-Turkish Relations 
  
Both Greece and Turkey have a long history with the European Union. They 
are among the first countries to develop relations with the emerging European 
Community; in fact, their history with the EC/EEC goes back to the end of 1950s. 
Their approach to the European Community represents remarkable similarities in the 
beginning of 1960s (Bilgiç and Karatzas, 2004: 1). Greece and Turkey first applied 
to the European Economic Community, one after another, in 1959 and were rejected 
due to the unfavorable democratic environments in both countries.  
The rest of the process with the EC was different. Starting from the early 
1960s till the end of 1990s, Turkish-EU relations were not generally successful 
compared to the Greek-EU relations (Bilgiç and Karatzas, 2004: 1).  Greece made its 
second application in 1975 and gained access to the EU in 1981. The second Turkish 
application for full EEC membership was submitted in 1987, which was rejected by 
the EEC Commission due to the economic and developmental gap between Turkey 
and the community.  
From Greek accession to the EU in 1981 to the Turkish candidacy in 1999, 
Greco-Turkish relations were situated on the external borders of the EU (Rumelili, 
2007: 106). However, once Turkey was accepted as a candidate country, Greek-
Turkish relations became a part of the EU politics (Siegl, 2002: 45). 
The literature is mostly in agreement that the EU failed to exercise positive 
influence on the Greek-Turkish disputes until 1999, while its positive impact can be 
noticed only after mid 1990s (Rumelili, 2004b: 5; Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2004:32; 
Çelik and Rumelili, 2006: 203-222; Rumelili, 2007). Three mechanisms through 
which the EU affected relations between Greece and Turkey are the carrot/stick 
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policy, democratization, and reconstruction of identities and interests; and 
strengthening of NGOs.  
Carrot/stick policy is a source of influence through offering/withdrawing 
membership status or threatening sanctions to this status (Rumelili, 2004a: 6; 
Rumelili, 2004b: 9; Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2004: 21; Rumelili, 2007).  The use of 
carrot/stick policy was limited until 1999 but stronger since mid-1999 (Rumelili, 
2004a: 6).  
The membership carrot makes policy makers of Greece and Turkey refrain 
from any attempt, which can create a crisis (Rumelili, 2004a: 6). If they have a 
pending membership, they prefer to restrain themselves from escalating crisis and to 
be moderate rather than antagonistic during the crisis in order not to jeopardize the 
membership perspective (Stetter, Mathias and Diez, 2004: 27). After they applied for 
membership to the European Community, Greece and Turkey did not engage in 
military action against each other. However, they reached the brink of war many 
times (Stetter, Mathias and Diez, 2004: 12). For instance, after 1974 Turkish 
intervention to Cyprus, Greek Prime Minister chose to handle Greek-Turkish 
relations peacefully, which is supposed to be the outcome of Greek foreign policy of 
the EU accession (Couloumbis and Yannas, 1994 in Rumelili, 2004a: 6). Similarly, 
upon 1976 Aegean continental shelf crisis, Karamanlis chose to deal with the crisis 
by taking it to the International Court of Justice of the UN rather than using military 
force. Thus, between the date of Greek application for membership in 1975 and its 
membership in 1981, Greece tried to secure its membership path by trying not to 
damage relations with Turkey (Rumelili, 2004a: 6; Rumelili and Çelik, 2006: 13).  
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After Greece became a member in 1981, the balance changed and Greece 
began to use its membership status against Turkey as a bargaining tool (Öniş, 
2001:37; Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2004: 28; Ioakimidis, 1994 in Rumelili, 2004a: 
11). While Greece started to exercise a key influence on Turkey, Turkey preferred to 
be moderate towards Greece. For instance, upon the 1987 Continental shelf crisis, 
Turkey restricted its reaction in order to prevent a Greek veto (Rumelili, 2004a: 7; 
Rumelili and Çelik, 2006: 14). However, neither the Turkish attitude nor the Davos 
process prevented Greek opposition to Turkish application. The main assumption of 
Greece was that it would feel more secure if Turkey remained out of the union 
(Oğuzlu, 2004a: 99). Any decisions that could improve Turkey-EU relations were 
blocked by Greece’s veto (Grigoriadis, 2003). 
Following the Turkish membership application in 1989, which was 
expectedly opposed by Greece, European Commission released an opinion stating 
that unless the Cyprus and Aegean issues were solved with Greece, Turkey could not 
be eligible for membership (Rumelili, 2004a: 7). The Commission stated that:  
…Unless exceptional circumstances intervened, it could not 
recommend starting accession negotiations with any country before 
1993 at the earliest. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Commission, 
having reviewed in depth the economic and social situation in that 
country, concluded that Turkey would find it hard to cope with the 
adjustment constraints with which it would be confronted in the 
medium term if it acceded to the Community. There was also the need 
to bear in mind certain substantial political problems such as the 
expansion of political pluralism, the continuation of the positive trend 
with regard to human rights and the right of minorities, the persistence 
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of disputes with a Member State and the lack of a solution to the 
Cyprus problem. Nevertheless, the Community wished to strengthen its 
relations with Turkey within the framework of the 1963 Association 
Agreement. Accordingly, without casting doubt in any way on 
Turkey’s eligibility to accede, it proposed a set of measures aimed at 
helping the country to modernize politically and economically 
(Opinion of the Commission, 1989). 
 
This action of the EU is one of its direct effects on Greek-Turkish relations. 
However, at that time, the EU carrot lost its credibility because Greece was already a 
member and the Commission’s report made Turkey perceive EU membership as a 
weak possibility (Rumelili, 2004a: 8). The main logic of Turkey, at that time, was 
that whatever Turkey does to accommodate Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus 
issues, EU would never agree to Turkey’s membership (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 99). 
Acquiring the membership status, Greece has tried to block the momentum of 
Turkish-EU relations (Öniş, 2001: 37; Oğuzlu, 2004a: 99). As an instance, Greek 
approval of Customs Union in 1995 was made conditional upon the acceptance of 
Southern Cyprus as a candidate country (Öniş, 2001: 37; Rumelili, 2004a: 7). 
Moreover, Greek veto blocked financial aid of the Union, which was promised to 
Turkey as a part of the creation of the Customs Union.  
 The negative Greek attitude and Turkey’s lost hope for EU membership 
resulted in deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey. Upon accepting 
Southern Cyprus as a candidate country and ignoring the rights of Turks on the 
island, the relations worsened and led the way to further crisis between Greece and 
Turkey (Öniş, 2001: 37). 
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This is the reason that until 1999, EU carrot/stick policy could not be used 
effectively. It could not make Turkey refrain from threatening Greece to annex 
Northern part of Cyprus and to go to war if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 
miles and to escalate Imia Crisis in 1996 (Rumelili, 2004a: 7; Öniş,2001: 37; Stetter, 
Albert and Diez, 2004: 12). 
After 1995, EU’s direct interventions in the Greco-Turkish disputes became 
more apparent. EU made peaceful resolution of disputes a condition for furthering 
relations with Turkey (Rumelili and Çelik, 2006: 203-222). Moreover, upon 1996 
Imia-Kardak Crisis, EU put its firm reaction to Turkey urging solidarity with Greece 
(Rumelili and Çelik, 2006:15). 
Enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts. The prospect 
of accession acts as a powerful incentive for the states concerned to 
settle any border disputes…Today several disputes, of low intensity, 
among applicants remain to be resolved…The Commission considers 
that, before accession, applicants should make every effort to resolve 
any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third 
countries. Failing this, they should agree that the dispute be referred to 
the International Court of Justice. In any event, all candidate countries 
should therefore, before accession negotiations are completed, commit 
themselves to submit unconditionally to compulsory jurisdiction, 
including advance ruling of the International Court of Justice in any 
present or future disputes(Agenda 2000). 
 
This text, Agenda 2000, requires that Turkey should settle all its disputes with 
Greece and in case of arbitration, accept unconditionally the power and authority of 
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the International Court of Justice; and act in accordance with the verdict of the court 
(Aksu, 2004: 47).  Therefore, with this text, the EU directly targets Greco-Turkish 
border conflicts and asserts opinion as a caution.   
Imia-Kardak Crisis of 1996 was followed by the S-300 crisis. However, like 
the Imia-Kardak crisis, S-300 crisis was soon overcome after Greece decided to 
relocate missiles from Cyprus to Crete. This act of Greece was criticized by some 
circles as a Greek concession (Gündoğdu, 2001: 106-117). However, the ones, who 
believe in the EU impact on modernization and democratization within the member 
and candidate countries would suggest that Greek attitude was related to the 
redefinition and modernization of   Greek interests, identity and political system in 
line with the European collective identity under the EU (Gündoğdu, 2001: 106-117; 
Keridis and Triantaphyllou,2001; Keridis,2001: 56). The European Union has 
contributed to the democratization processes of Greece and Turkey by urging them to 
implement reforms for fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria (Öniş, 2005: 265-284; 
Bilgiç and Karatzas, 2004: 6). 
Through reconstruction of identities of the two countries, the EU supposedly 
affects policymakers’ definitions of national or group interest (Rumelili, 2004a: 10). 
By 1990, Greece has taken important steps towards consolidation of its economy and 
democracy under the set of incentives of EC/EU (Öniş, 2002: 13). Therefore it is 
suggested that Greek attitude towards Turkey, since 1999, is not merely tactical but 
is a result of transformation of Greek democracy. 
 However, the strand of the literature, which claims that the EU was not 
effective on the two countries’ bilateral relations until 1999, explains 1999 
rapprochement as reappearance of the credibility of the EU carrot for Turkey 
(Rumelili, 2004a: 10). Declaration of Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki 
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Summit remotivated and urged Turkey about the resolution of border disputes as a 
community principle.  
Another impact of the EU on conflicts is strengthening the civil society 
(Rumelili, 2004a: 15; Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2004: 22). In the previous 
rapprochement periods, the main problem was the lack of public support (Birand, 
1991: 27-39; Coufoudakis, 1991: 40-55; Kirisci and Çarkoğlu, 2003: 117-153). Civil 
society development, which has been supported by the EU, is the catalysts for the 
conflict diminishing policies in the two countries. The EU arranged many programs 
in order to promote democratization and civil society action in both countries 
(Stetter, Albert and Diez, 2004: 30). 
Besides these roles of the EU concerning Greco-Turkish relations suggested 
by the literature, some also pay attention to the instrumental and tactical logic of 
policies of Greece and Turkey during the transformation of bilateral relations. Until 
the mid-1990s, the main logic of Greek policies toward Turkey was that Greece 
would be more secure if Turkey continued to remain outside of the EU. Thus, from 
its accession to the EU in 1981 towards the end of 1990s, Greece tried to blockade 
the developments in Turkey’s relations with the EU. To this end, continuation of no-
solution policy in the Aegean and Cyprus issues served Greek interests (Oğuzlu, 
2004a: 99). 
However, in late 1990s, Greek leadership realized that it would be impossible 
to solve bilateral disputes with Turkey if Turkey was isolated from the Union 
(Papanicolaou, 2005: 151). Greece’s bargaining power vis a vis Turkey depend on 
Turkey’s aspiration to become a member.  Greece would lose this power if Turkey 
was left out of the EU as happened after the Luxemburg Summit of 1997 (Öniş, 
2002: 12; Öniş, 2001: 38).  
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In order to join the Euro-zone and enable the accession of Republic of Cyprus 
to the EU, Greece encouraged Turkish candidacy at the Helsinki Summit (Öniş and 
Yılmaz, 2007). Thus, Turkey would be more flexible for the resolution of disputes 
over Aegean and Cyprus. In addition, the resolution of disputes would make Greece 
closer to the Euro-zone (Oğuzlu, 2004b: 348). Thus by the Helsinki Summit, the EU 
abandoned its policy of isolating Turkey and preferred the strategy of binding and 
integrating it into Europe. The positive attitude of Greece was driven by the 
assumption that Turkey would have a strong incentive to resolve disputes with 
Greece if there is a real perspective of EU accession (Siegl, 2002: 45; Öniş, 2001: 3). 
Meanwhile, Turkey realized that better relations with Greece would be more 
advantageous for its relations with the EU. This reciprocal gains led them to 
cooperate (Couloumbis and Ifantis, 2002: 1-25). 
 Therefore, the literature, which argues that despite the increasing dialogue, 
current Greco-Turkish relations are fragile, assumes the logic that Greece and Turkey 
approach each other with solely tactical reasons. Both Greece and Turkey are aware 
that any Greek-Turkish tension will isolate both belligerents from their Western 
institutional allies, notably the European structure (Couloumbis, 1999: 24-48). 
Moreover, it would damage Turkish plans to be a part of the EU and Greece to 
integrate the European Monetary Union (EMU) (Oğuzlu, 2004a: 93, Oğuzlu, 2004b: 
337). 
In conclusion, the literature review reveals that since 1999, Greece and 
Turkey experience collaboration mostly on issues of low politics. They initially 
prefer to cooperate on issues that they can engage in a dialogue, rather than hard-core 
issues affecting their national interests and security. However, it should also be noted 
that recently, there has been political willingness and efforts to ameliorate bilateral 
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relations and to manage main disputes between Greece and Turkey. Political cycles 
initiated talks and exchanged views on issues of high politics.  
Having discussed the historical background of the Greco-Turkish relations 
and the literature that argues for and against a transformation in relations towards 
cooperation, in the next chapter I examine empirical evidence for the change in the 
relations between Turkey and Greece. I use economic and military indicators to find 
out if there has indeed been a transformation. Finally, in the empirical chapter, I 
reevaluate the arguments on the EU impact on Greco-Turkish relations.      
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed what scholars suggest about Greek-
Turkish relations and discussed which indicators are utilized in the following 
empirical analysis, following the literature. From my literature review, it appears that 
Greece and Turkey, although far from reaching a solution on the main disputes, 
currently increased formal and informal dialogue, notably on low politics issues such 
as trade, tourism, terrorism, culture, and so forth. (Öniş, 2001: 42; Heraclides, 2002: 
23). Furthermore, governmental dialogue has considerably increased compared to the 
previous years so that the two countries could enter common projects on which they 
can work together.  
 
 
3.1. Transformation in Military Relations 
 
Transformation of military relations reflects the changes in military actions of 
states towards each other. Therefore, this section analyzes whether there has been a 
change in Greco-Turkish military actions from competitive to a cooperative one. To 
that end, I use the Militarized Inter-state Dispute (MID) data set, which is included in 
the Correlates of War (COW) Project. The variable I utilize is the hostility level. The 
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codebook and the data sets of the COW project are available through Eugene 
software, which can be downloaded online.4 The software is quite user-friendly and 
is widely used by international relations scholars who include quantitative analyses 
in their work. The Correlates of War project facilitates the collection and use of 
quantitative data through several data sets, which are organized according to the area 
of research.5  
In my empirical analysis, I use the Militarized Inter-state Disputes (MID) data 
set since it covers all the instances in which a state threatens displays or uses force 
against another state in the period between 1816 and 2001. Therefore, to study the 
case of Greece and Turkey in a time-series framework, the MID data set is very 
suitable to find out all the disputes between the two neighboring states.6  
The MID dataset is organized at two levels. The dispute level data set uses 
each dispute as the unit of analysis and the participant level version includes each 
participant as the unit of analysis.7 The first one summarizes the information for the 
whole dispute and the latter gives information about each state within the dispute. In 
this analysis, I use the participant level MID data set, which provides information 
about Greece and Turkey individually. I prefer this unit of analysis in order to 
analyze the change in actions of each participant state towards each other. Therefore, 
by using the participant level MID data set, I follow changes in each state’s military 
action against each other and monitor which state is more or less hostile during the 
                     
4Available at http://eugenesoftware.org/ 
 
5
 For detailed information about COW Project see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
 
6A militarized inter-state dispute involves threat, display, and use of force by a state explicitly directed 
to another state. Threat is defined as the verbal indication of a hostile intend. Display of force is a 
military demonstration, which does not involve combat. And lastly use of force involves active 
military operations.  
 
7There have been available documents at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/, which explains both 
incident and participant level data sets 
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years in question. The data set includes variables such as dates of involvement of 
states in a dispute, the side on which state participates, level of fatalities suffered by 
states, hostility level, and the highest level of action taken by states. Among these 
variables, I use the “hostility level” variable to measure the level of change in 
military action by Greece and Turkey against each other.  
The variable is in a five-point scale ranging from no militarized action to war. 
Each of the hostility levels are represented by different numbers as shown below:8 
1 – No militarized action 
2 – Threat to use force 
3 – Display of use of Force 
4 – Use of force 
5 – War 
 
Thus, the hostility level variable reflects the level of hostility reached during 
the incidents in which two states are on the opposite sides9. Considering the Greek-
Turkish disputes, I scale hostility levels reached by Greece and Turkey and examine 
the changes in this scale in the MID data.  
The figure below shows the changes in the two countries’ hostility levels 
during their bilateral disputes within the period between 1945 and 2001. I chose to 
look at these years because the end of World War II has changed the world order and 
since then, the feature of the armed conflicts has changed and there appear to be 
large number of disputes, which are not actually wars but crises or non-war conflicts. 
Considering that Greece and Turkey have not been in war since 1945, my goal was 
to reach all the crises and disputes using the COW Project. Unfortunately, the data 
                     
8Information has been retrieved from the PDF document available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
 
9
 For detailed information see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
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end in 2001 and there are only two years to compare a transformation before and 
after 1999.  
 
Figure 1. Hostility Level of Greece and Turkey between 1945 and 2001 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ho
st
ili
ty
 
Le
v
el
s
Year
Hostility Level
Turkey
Greece
 
 
 
Analysis of the figure 1 and a comparison of the periods before and after 
1999 show that there has been a decrease in the hostility levels of the two countries, 
notably of Turkey. Since 1999, the hostility levels of both Greece and Turkey have 
not exceeded level 3, which means display of use of force. Interestingly, all the 
recorded MIDs after 1999 are territorial and air space violations.10  
The highest point of hostility was reached in 1974 when Turkey and Greece 
came to the brink of war due to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Since 1974, 
Greece and Turkey were twice in crises considered by many observers as close to 
                     
10
 In order to see recorded MIDs see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
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war (Giannis, 1989 in Christodoulaki, Ikonomaki, and Orkun, 2001: 3; Sitilides, 
1997). Crises in 1987 and 1996 were related to the status of the Aegean. The first 
one, the Aegean crisis, was the result of an official decision of Turkey to realize 
offshore exploration in controversial waters, and the second was the Imia-Kardak 
crisis. On these two dates, the hostility levels scaled level 4, which means use of 
force.  
It appears that in Figure 1, the years between 1996 and 1998 witness a 
continuing hostility level for both Greece and Turkey at the level of 4. The news 
reports in these years show that this might be because of the crisis erupted by Greek 
plans to deploy S-300 missiles in the Greek side of Cyprus. In the news reports, the 
most important event of 1997 and 1998 appears as the deployment of S-300 missiles. 
Within that period, Greece and Turkey, many times, threatened each other for war. 
Turkey accepted this attempt of Greece as a threat to its security and took the 
necessary measures (Hürriyet, 20.09.1997). Warplanes were loaded with necessary 
military equipment for any possible attack (Hürriyet, 14.11.1997). It was reported in 
the newspapers that international media began to make war scenarios between 
Greece and Turkey (Hürriyet, 03.07.1998). Any spark could lead to war. This may be 
the reason of high hostility level recorded in 1997 and 1998.  
 Another event in 1998 was that Greek aircrafts landed at the Baf military base 
in Cyprus, which was opened to deploy S-300 missiles and Greek aircrafts. This 
attempt of Greece again escalated the tension between the two countries over the 
island (Hürriyet, 25.01.1998).  Turkey stated that if Greece was planning to take 
action against Turkish security, this attempt would be reciprocated (Hürriyet, 
19.06.1998). This tension partially deescalated towards the end of 1998 and the 
meeting of the Sea Commanders followed. Initially, the deployment of S-300 was 
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postponed and then they were deployed to Crete (Hürriyet, 08.11.1998). Figure 1 
indicates that Greek and Turkish hostility levels decreased after 1999 and the end of 
S-300 crisis seems to explain this decrease in hostility levels between the two 
countries. 
Therefore, according to the figure 1, for Turkey, before 1999, hostility level 
mostly exceeded or stayed at the same level as the Greek hostility level. This fact 
shows that Turkey, before 1999, was more hostile than Greece during the MIDs in 
question. However, after 1999, there has been a significant decrease in the hostility 
level of Turkey. Therefore, I argue that the data show a trend where Turkey since 
1999 has recorded a military rapprochement towards Greece.  
 Greece, in Figure 1, before 1999, was less hostile than Turkey or at the most 
stood at the same level. After 1999, its hostility level either stayed at the same level 
with Turkey or exceeded Turkish hostility only once in 2001. Therefore, regarding 
the hostility level after 1999, the figure 1 illustrates that while Greece experiences a 
slight change, Turkey experiences a more significant one. 
Political factors can be effective in this decrease of the hostility level of the 
two countries, shown in Figure 1. With regard to Turkey, the membership efforts to 
the EU may be a factor. As I mentioned in the literature review chapter, the European 
carrot policy loses its credibility in the eyes of Turkey when Turkey stops believing 
in the prospects of membership assuming that whatever it does, it would never be 
perceived and accepted as a European country. Thus, Turkey might be reluctant to be 
sensitive about Greco-Turkish relations at that time. That is why Turkish hostility 
was used to be higher than the Greek hostility in Figure 1.  
On the contrary, after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, which granted Turkey 
candidacy status, EU’s carrot policy gained its credibility back. In pursuit of the EU 
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membership, Turkey preferred to be moderate towards Greece because Turkey was a 
candidate country while Greece was an EU member. (Couloumbis and Ifantis, 2002: 
1-25). This could be the reason that since 1999, Turkey preferred to assume a careful 
attitude over the Aegean and it is less hostile to Greece compared to the period 
before 1999. 
Another possibility of transformation for both Greece and Turkey may be the 
motives of the leaders as well as their personal friendships11. Late Ismail Cem and 
Yorgo Papandreu, then foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece followed friendly 
dialogue with each other. In 1999, the two foreign ministers, Cem and Papandreu 
assumed the principle of “Dialogue First” for bilateral crises and held the first 
meeting of bilateral dialogue on tourism, environment, trade and possible regional 
cooperation (Hürriyet, 27.06.1999). Greek foreign minister explained this dialogue 
with the following speech at the 54th UN General Assembly meeting on 22 
September 1999: 
If the road to peace is indeed made up of a collection of moments, 
then I also dare hope for our relations with Turkey. My Turkish 
counterpart, İsmail Cem, and I have been engaged in careful 
diplomacy for many months. We recently inaugurated discussion 
committees to address a number of bilateral concerns, including 
trade, tourism and the environment, where we feel our two 
countries have much to gain from mutual Cupertino. People’s 
aspirations for the principles of democracy, security, and 
prosperity can overcome historical strife. In this democratic spirit, 
we believe that our security is bound by the stability in the region; 
                     
11
  When İsmail Cem passed away, his counterpart Yorgos Papandreu stated that he lost a friend 
(Radikal, 27.01.2007). 
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that our neighbor’s strength is our own strength (Reuter, 1999). 
 
In 2001, Greece and Turkey agreed to develop a “Red Phone Line” by which 
they could communicate with each other even for simple issues (Milliyet, 
25.06.2001). Additionally, to trace what happened after 2001, the year that the 
quantitative data end, I surveyed the media. In 2002, the Aegean Dialogue officially 
began between the two countries (Hürriyet, 12.03.2002). After that year, dialogue 
concerning Aegean problems gained momentum. Moreover, under different 
governments this affirmative process continued and in 2005, the two new foreign 
ministers, Abdullah Gül and Petros Molivyatis  again put the historical project of 
“Red Phone Line” between Eskişehir and Larissa to the table in order to increase 
flight security (Hürriyet, 13.04.2005). Therefore, the change in the two countries’ 
hostility levels after 1999 may also be due to the friendly dialogue between the two 
countries’ political elites. It appears that even though the governments have changed, 
this dialogue has become a habit rather than a short-term policy of governmental 
politics. 
This change in the two countries’ political relations can also be noticed in 
relations between the two countries’ military staff.  Greece and Turkey’s military 
authorities entered a dialogue, which could not be imagined a few years earlier. The 
focus has been generally the prevention of any possible tension over the Aegean. 
This seems to be a signal that there has been military willingness on both sides to 
diminish tension and manage crisis. 
In 2002, Greek and Turkish Defense Ministers agreed to form a direct contact 
mechanism by which they aimed to prevent tension or take immediate action against 
any tension over the Aegean (Hürriyet, 13.09.2002). Meanwhile, regarding military 
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expenditures, which have taken attention from many scholars as previously 
mentioned, the Defense Minister of Greece, in 2004, declared that Greece would cut 
25% of its military expenditure within a 5-year period (Milliyet, 18.05.2004). 
Considering the statements of Greek Defense Minister in 2002 and 2003 referencing 
Turkey as an excuse to high Greek military expenditure, this change in Greek 
attitude is the signal of affirmative transformation in Greco-Turkish military 
relations.  Meanwhile, this development may have a contribution to the establishment 
of trust towards the neighbor country, which was previously assumed the number one 
threat. 
Another striking point in military relations, which might have an effect on 
decreasing hostility, is the bilateral visits of the two countries’ Heads of General 
Staff. First time in decades, the Heads of General Staff of the two countries 
undertook visits to discuss conflict-diminishing measures over the Aegean (Radikal, 
01.11.2006). In 2006, they agreed to form a common operation unit under the 
structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Radikal, 05.11.2006). 
Meanwhile, due to the increasing number of violations over the Aegean, certain 
measures have been initiated by the two countries’ military staff. The Greek and 
Turkish military offices agreed to put a certain distance between the training zones of 
Greek and Turkish warplanes in 2006 and, in 2007, upon the dogfight, which 
resulted in the death of a Greek pilot. The Head of Turkish General Staff, Yasar 
Büyükanıt, proposed unarmed flights over the Aegean and called Greece for action: 
We are ready to disarm our aircrafts. I do not understand why we 
(Greece and Turkey) do not disarm our flights. We are not enemies. 
Thinking of the young pilots in the recent crash, the danger is 
apparent. We saw what happened over Aegean lastly. Isn’t it a pity? 
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We are ready to do that. You also are (Radikal, 18.04.2007). 
 
Giving the example of the establishment of the European Union, Büyükanıt 
stated his hopeful sentiments: 
 No one could imagine that enemies would eventually form the 
European   Union at the end of the war. As long as willingness exists, 
there is always a solution. I believe that one day we are going to 
solve our problems (with Greece) (Milliyet, 20.04.2007). 
 
However, despite the dramatic change in the two countries’ military dialogue 
and the attitude of the military staff, tension over the Aegean and in the periphery of 
Cyprus did not completely end. My survey of news reports illustrate that between 
1999 and 2001, military tension was caused only by bilateral territory and air space 
violations12. This is the reason that, in Figure 1, hostility level between these years 
indicates the same number. It should also be noted that in the recent years these 
violations are becoming more frequent. Table 1 shows the recent number of 
territorial and air space violations between Greece and Turkey.13  
 
 
 
 
 
                     
12
  I reached this argument from my daily survey of news reports from three Turkish newspapers, 
Hürriyet, Radikal and Milliyet 
 
13
  These numbers are derived from the news reports of three Turkish newspapers; Hürriyet, Radikal 
and Milliyet. Thus these violations are just the ones reflected in the newspapers, the numbers are 
larger in the web site of the Ministry of General Staff ; http://www.tsk.mil.tr 
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Table 1. Number of Territorial and Air Space Violations 
 
Year 
Number of Territorial 
 and Airspace Violations 
1997 1 
1998 1 
1999 1 
2000 0 
2001 1 
2002 3 
2003 4 
2004 6 
2005 7 
2006 7 
2007 18 
 
 
Table 1 shows that in recent years there has been an increase in recorded air 
space and territorial sea violations whereas Figure 1 illustrated that since 1999, 
hostility level has decreased. The reason is that more important security issues such 
as S-300 missiles disappeared and the major problem between the two countries 
remained as violations over the Aegean.  Therefore, these violations have been the 
only military tension that is reflected in the newspapers. However, it is interesting 
that in the recent years these violations considerably increased. It is almost like 
hostility levels decreased between the two countries, but teasing activities replaced 
serious, hostile crises.   
 Another interesting argument that can be made to explain the discrepancy 
between Figure 1 and Table 1 is that uncertainty in military relations between Greece 
and Turkey has decreased since 1999. While hostility levels used to fluctuate before 
1999, both Greek and Turkish hostility levels became more stable afterwards. In 
2001, Turkish hostility points out to level 1, which means lack of militarized action 
while Greek hostility is at level 3, representing display of use of force. Considering 
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that all the MIDs since 1999 are territorial and air space violations, these hostility 
levels may illustrate that Turkey was reluctant to retaliate at the time in question due 
to an understanding of unfruitful results of escalation of hostility. 
It is also worth mentioning that the year in which hostility reached the highest 
point is 1974. The hostility level in this year comes across as level 5, which means 
“war” according to the MID data in the coding system of the COW Project. The  
dispute in question is the Cyprus War, which started by the intervention of Turkey 
following the Greek Cypriot coup sponsored by Greek military junta and ended with 
Turkish occupation of one-third of the island (İsmail, 1988). Interestingly, the 
Turkish literature does not evaluate the 1974 intervention of Turkey in Cyprus as a 
war. However, the COW project does. Thus, it should be noted that a widely-used 
and comprehensive international relations project accepts that Greece and Turkey got 
into an inter-state war in 1974. According to the Turkish literature, the actual level of 
this MID should have been between 4 and 5.  
To sum up, it appears that hostility levels of Greece and Turkey have 
decreased since 1999 but did not come to an end. Coded militarized interstate 
disputes show that bilateral territorial and air space violations still create tension over 
the Aegean and in the periphery of Cyprus. The data illustrate that the main reason 
behind the existence of military tension between Greece and Turkey has been the 
unsolved Aegean disputes. However, I suggest that despite the tension over the 
Aegean, both states seem to record an important development in military relations 
and considering the decrease in the hostility levels of Greece and Turkey, notably of 
Turkey, there has been an evolving transformation in the two countries’ military 
actions towards each other. 
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3.2. Transformation of Economic Relations 
 
This section analyzes if there has been an affirmative transformation in Greek-
Turkish economic relations. In the analysis, I utilize three indicators, which are 
bilateral trade, investment, and bilateral tourist exchange. The reason behind 
choosing these indicators is that they form the major economic activities between 
any two countries. For trade relations, I examine data on Turkish exports to and 
imports from Greece. For investment, variables used are foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from Greece and capital investment of Turkey in Greece, which will identify 
the investment trends of the two countries towards each other. Eventually, for 
tourism, I analyze data showing the changes in the entry of Greek citizens to Turkey 
and departing Turkish citizens to Greece. All of these indicators accumulate changes 
to show the overall trend in Greek-Turkish economic relations and give clues about 
the changing trust and friendship, and economic interdependence between two 
neighboring countries. 
 
 
3.2.1. Trade 
 
The trend in trade relations between Greece and Turkey before and after 1999 
is analyzed to see whether there has been a transformation in the two countries’ 
relations. 
The table 2 below shows total exports of Turkey to abroad and specifically 
the exports to Greece. I also calculated the percentage of exports to Greece within the 
total exports and added it to the table in the last column. Data are not available in the 
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period between 1945 and 1996, so the Table 2 covers data from 1996 to 2006.  
 
Table 2.  Exports of Turkey (000 dollars)14 
  
 
Table 2 indicates that both total exports of Turkey and exports from Turkey to 
Greece have an increasing trend since 1996. However, the share of exports to Greece 
within the total exports shows that although the exports to Greece increased in 
number, its share within the total exports has not steadily increased. Still, compared 
to the previous years, it can be argued that there is an increase in the share of exports 
to Greece even though it is not a dramatic one. Shares never decreased to the levels 
during the period before 1999. Changes in the share can be seen below in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
                     
14
 Statistics were retreived from  http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624  in 
15.05.2007 
Year Total Exports Exports to Greece 
% of Exports to Greece within 
the total exports 
1996 23 224 465  236 464 %1.01 
1997 26 261 072  298 237 %1.13 
1998 26 973 952  370 039 %1.37 
1999 26 587 225  406 794 %1.53 
2000 27 774 906  437 725 %1.57 
2001 31 334 216  476 095 %1.51 
2002 36 059 089  590 382 %1.63 
2003 47 252 836  920 401 %1.94 
2004 63 167 153 1 171 203 %1.85 
2005 73 476 408 1 126 678 %1.53 
2006   85 478 556   1 601 371 %1.87 
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Figure 2. Share of Exports to Greece within Total Exports 
Share of Exports to Greece within the Total exports 
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Since 1996, the share of exports to Greece has increased, even though the 
increase is not a dramatic one. Except the year 2001, in which Turkey experienced an 
economic crisis, share of exports to Greece increased until 2003and in 2003, this 
share peaked.  
The reason of this increase might be the Restrictive Agreement on Double 
Tax, which was  signed by Greek and Turkish governments in 2003.15 It appeared as 
an initiative to increase and facilitate trade between the two countries. Following the 
year 2003, the share began to decline until 2006, in which trade seems to recover. 
The reason of this decline after 2003 might be that Turkey might have tried to 
develop its foreign trade volume by either increasing its trade with its existing trade 
partners or gaining new ones. Thus, share of exports to Greece might have lessened 
within the total trade.  
On the other hand, there may be other arguments by which small share of 
exports to Greece might be explained.  One reason might be that Greece and Turkey 
                     
15
 For more information about the agreement see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
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have competitive trade goods. The two states are in the same geography and have the 
same climate, thus naturally similar products are produced. That might create a stable 
export trend from Turkey to Greece independent of increasing economic cooperation 
in general. Regarding what goods Greece and Turkey exchange, whether raw or 
processed materials, Öniş (2004: 11) states that bilateral trade of Greece and Turkey 
has an inter-industry character. Turkey mostly exports to Greece capital-intensive 
goods, while Greece exports resource-intensive goods to Turkey.  
 Moreover, Figure 2 illustrates that, even though the data before 1996 is not 
available, considering the available years, Turkish exports were not affected from the 
disputes between the two countries. Despite the Kardak Crisis of 1996 and Öcalan 
Crisis in 1999, which were mentioned in the literature review chapter, trade flow 
between the two states continued to grow. In the previous section, it appeared that 
even though the hostility level of the disputes decreased between Greece and Turkey, 
it did not disappear. Figure 2 interestingly shows that trade relations continue 
independently from these tensions over the Aegean and are not negatively affected. 
 For further investigation, besides the shares of exports to Greece within total 
Turkish exports, I also considered Gross National Product (GNP) of the years in 
question in order to reach more striking clues about the Greek-Turkish trade 
relations. Table 3 below shows the share of exports of Turkey to Greece within the 
GNP.   
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Table 3. Exports to Greece/ Gross National Product (GNP) (%) 
 
 
As Table 3 indicates, GNP of Turkey has a growing trend after a sharp 
decrease in 2001, which was due to the economic crisis of that year.  These data 
show that Turkish exports to Greece increase parallel to changes in the GNP. The 
exceptional years have been 2001 and 2005. In 2001, while the GNP decreased, 
share of exports to Greece increased. In 2005, this share decreased while the GNP 
witnessed a significant increase. These numbers support the idea that Turkey has a 
certain export trend towards Greece.  
Meanwhile, Turkish exports’ share to Greece within the GNP has a different 
trend than its share within the total foreign trade of Turkey. Its share within the GNP 
has an increasing trend while it was stable within total trade. This share never 
decreased with the exception of 2005.  
Tables and figures so far illustrate that Turkish exports to Greece do not 
occupy a big part within the total Turkish exports abroad. However, it should be 
highlighted that there is definitely an increasing trend albeit a minor one. 
 
Year GNP (000 000 dollars) Export to Greece/GNP 
1996 183.601 0,12 
1997 192.383 0,15 
1998 206.552 0,17 
1999 185.267 0,21 
2000 200.002 0,21 
2001 145.693 0,32 
2002 180.892 0,32 
2003 239.235 0,38 
2004 299.475 0,39 
2005 360.876 0,31 
2006 399.673 0,4 
  
43 
Following the export trends, as another indicator concerning trade, I analyze 
imports from Greece and as I did for exports, considering its share within the total 
imports and the GNP.  
 
Table 4. Imports (000 Dollars)16 
 
 
As Table 4 indicates, Turkish imports from Greece show an increasing trend 
in number until 1999. In 1999, we notice that imports numerically decrease. The 
reason might be the Öcalan Crisis. Appearance of Greek support for terrorist leader 
Abdullah Öcalan might have decreased the reliability of Greece. Turkish firms might 
have been under the pressure of civilians to cut back on imports as they did against 
Italian products.  The reaction of businessmen can be noticed from the speech of 
Rahmi Koç, Chairman of the Board of Koç Holding who resigned from the 
presidency of Greek-Turkish Business Council upon the Greek involvement in 
Öcalan’s escape. He stated that: 
 
                     
16
 Statistics were retreived from  http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=625 in 
15.05.2007 
Year Total Imports  Imports from Greece 
Share of imports from 
Greece within the total 
imports 
1996 43 626 642  284 959 %0.65 
1997 48 558 721  430 780 %0.88 
1998 45 921 392  319 751 %0.69 
1999 40 671 272  287 555 %0.70 
2000 54 502 821  430 813 %0.79 
2001 41 399 083  266 254 %0.64 
2002 51 553 797  312 462 %0.60 
2003 69 339 692  427 743 %0.67 
2004 97 539 766  594 351 %0.60 
2005  116 774 151   727 830 %0.62 
2006 138 290 264  1 041 099 %0.75 
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From 21 December 1992 till today as the president of Greek-Turkish  
Business Council, we really worked hard for the improvement of 
business and cultural relations, and even political relations with 
neighbor Greece. However, we did not receive the same warmness 
and hospitality from Greek businessmen. We were always the 
initiators. All these efforts could not go beyond personal friendship. 
Still we were determined to go on and believed that we should not 
give up. Personally, I have resisted many criticisms from inside and 
outside of the group. However, recent developments proved that all 
of the efforts are in vain; the agenda of Greek counterpart is different 
from ours. Under these conditions, it appears that Greek-Turkish 
Business Council have no meaning. That is why I would like to 
resign from my position (Hürriyet, 26.02.1999). 
 
Resignation of Rahmi Koç is the signal of Turkish businesspersons’ opinion 
about their ties with the Greek counterparts. 
Meanwhile, Table 4 shows that in 2000, share of imports from Greece 
increased again. This is most likely due to the cooperation agreements in 2000, 
which aim to increase bilateral trade between the two countries.17 
Table 4 also shows that since 2001 imports from Greece are on an increasing 
trend nominally. However, examination of the share of Greek imports within the 
total share indicates that shares do not increase but rather fluctuate. Imports indicated 
nominally and the percentage within the total show different trends. The reason 
might be that numerical increase is a general trend of Turkish import policies, not 
                     
17
 For more detailed information about the bilateral agreements see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
  
45 
related to its relations with Greece. Recovering of the economy after the 2001 crisis 
may have led Turkey to import more and this leads to an increase in imports from 
Greece parallel to total imports. Looking at the share of imports before and after 
1999, comparison will support the idea that 1999 is not a turning point for this 
indicator. Share of imports from Greece does not have an increasing trend; on the 
contrary, imports from Greece never reached the level achieved in 1997. It is 
interesting that Greco-Turkish trade relations were not affected from the Imia-
Kardak Crisis of 1996. Just after a year, Turkish imports from Greece boomed. It 
shows that Greek-Turkish economic relations are not necessarily influenced from the 
bilateral military disputes.  
Turkish import trend from Greece can better be observed in the figure below, 
which shows the share of imports from Greece within the total imports.  
 
Figure 3. Share of Imports from Greece within the total imports 
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Figure 3 above illustrates that share of imports from Greece is not a 
satisfactory indicator due to its fluctuating trend to analyze transformation in Greco-
Turkish relations. The year 2000 experienced a high share of imports from Greece. 
The reason might be Economic Cooperation Agreement and Agreement on Sea 
Transportation in 2000, aiming to increase bilateral economic activities18. Except 
2000, rest of the years shows mostly the same trend. This fact indicates that 
cooperation agreements did not affect the import trend of Turkey from Greece. In the 
meantime, figure 3 illustrates that imports from Greece, like exports to Greece, were 
not affected from the disputes. Because, even after 1999, share of imports are still 
lower than the previous years, in which hostility levels were higher. The reason 
might be again the same geographical and climatic area that both countries share. 
They might have only certain trade goods to exchange and thus, their export and 
import base cannot be expanded much.  
 Findings from the Turkish import trend showed that neither the increasing 
economic dialogue nor deescalating military tensions over the Aegean seem to affect 
the trend in the share of imports from Greece. This is the case despite the number of 
economic cooperation agreements signed in 2000. Thus, it may again be necessary to 
consider GNP of Turkey and find out the ratio of imports from Greece within the 
GNP. Table 5 below shows the data on Turkish GNP between 1996 and 2006 and the 
percentage of imports from Greece / GNP.  
 
 
 
 
                     
18
  For more information about these bilateral agreements see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
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Table 5. Imports from Greece / Gross National Product (GNP) (%) 
 
 
Table 5 shows that the share of imports from Greece within the GNP does not 
witness a considerable change after 1999. Shares are almost the same and does not 
show a dramatic change from the previous year except 2000 in which cooperation 
agreements were signed. The reason, for both export and import habits, might be, as 
mentioned before, the same geography and the same climate, which leaves them with 
competitive trade goods. However, it should be noted that since 2003 there has been 
a continuous increase in the share of imports from Greece within the GNP. That may 
be due to the Restrictive Agreement on Double Taxation, which was signed in 
2003.19  
Both export and import data indicate that the two countries’ trade relations 
did not show a considerable change after 1999, which is assumed to be the starting 
year of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Rather trade relations have evolved 
independently of the 1999 turning point as well as the military disputes. This fact 
indicates that trade relations between the two countries may not be a sound indicator 
to analyze the current transformation in Greek-Turkish relations. Their trade relations 
                     
19
 For more information about the agreement see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
Year Import/GNP (%) 
1996 0,15 
1997 0,22 
1998 0,15 
1999 0,15 
2000 0,21 
2001 0,18 
2002 0,17 
2003 0,17 
2004 0,19 
2005 0,2 
2006 0,26 
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have not experienced a dramatic change. Neither rapprochement nor disputes brought 
a sharp change in the trade habits of the two countries.  
 
 
3.2.2. Investment 
 
As another major economic activity, I evaluate the two countries’ bilateral 
investment trends. To that end, I utilized two indicators: 
1- Foreign direct investment from Greece 
2- Exported capital of Turkey to Greece 
 
Even though increasing dialogue has not been reflected in trade relations 
much, data shows that its effect has been clearly seen in investment. Even though 
bilateral investment is not striking, it is much better comparing the previous years. 
The table below shows the changes in authorized Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
from Greece in Turkey.  
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Table 6. Authorized Foreign Direct Investment from Abroad (million US 
dollar)20 
Years 
Authorized FDI 
from Greece 
Total FDI  
In Turkey 
Share of FDI from Greece 
within the total FDI 
1996 1,2 3.836,69 0,03 
1997 1,99 1.678,21 0,11 
1998 1,56 1.647,44 0,09 
1999 2,64 1.700,57 0,15 
2000 32,7 3.474,93 0,94 
2001 3,47 2.726,14 0,12 
2002 4,85 2.242,92 0,21 
 
 
Table 6 shows an increasing trend in Greek investment within Turkey. It 
appears that, different from trade relations, there has been a significant change after 
1999 in investment rate of Greece in Turkey. Notably, in 2000, FDI from Greece 
peaked. Meanwhile, considering the share of Greek FDI in Turkey within total 
investment, 2000 again records the highest share. The reason might be the signature 
of Agreement on Bilateral Encouragement of Investment in 2000.21  
This positive change in the Greek investment within Turkey after 1999 can be 
seen as a sign of increasing trust between the two countries. This is also an indication 
of increasing trust of Greece in the stability of Turkish economy.  
According to Table 6, 2001 witnessed a sharp decrease in both total and share 
of Greek investments in Turkey. The reason is probably the decreasing trust to 
Turkish economic stability due to the 2001 economic crisis. At that time, Turkey 
assumed to be an unsuitable country for investment. In the following year, 2002, this 
falling trend in investment recovered and authorized FDI from Greece again 
increased.  
                     
20
 Statistics were retreived from  http://www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/yabser/izin_ulkeler.xls  in 18.05.2007 
 
21
 For more information about the agreement see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
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The data from 2002 till today has not been available. However, in the website 
of the Treasury, it was stated that today there have been 76 Greek companies 
operating in Turkey. Moreover, the share of Greek capital in Turkey within the total 
amount of foreign capital is currently % 0, 40 while it was 0, 21 in 2002. These facts 
prove that there has been an economic rapprochement between Greece and Turkey 
regarding their investment relations. 
As far as the Turkish capital export to Greece is concerned, the data have 
been available from 1998 to 2004. Therefore, Table 7 below shows the Turkish 
capital exported to Greece and total capital exported to abroad between the years of 
1996 and 2004. Moreover, the table contains the number of Turkish firms in Greece 
and the total number of Turkish firms abroad. 
 
Table 7.  Exported Capital of Turkey (US Dollars)22 
 
 
 
 
                     
22
 Statistics were retreived from http://www.hazine.gov.tr/stat/yabser/sermaye_ihraci.xls  in 
17.05.2007 
 
Year 
Number of 
Firms in 
Greece 
Capital 
Exported to 
Greece 
Total Firms 
Abroad 
Total Capital 
Export Abroad 
Share of 
capital 
exported to 
Greece within 
total  
1998 0 0 928 2.128.546.343 0 
1999 0 185.750 101 649.908.806 0,02 
2000 0 0 89 1.189.972.388 0 
2001 2 52.233 98 1.458.862.464 0,003 
2002 1 189.795 104 425.657.073 0,04 
2003 1 187.740 112 710.643.984 0,02 
2004 2 262.880 150 856.347.836 0,03 
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As table 7 illustrates, Turkish firms did not enter the Greek market until 2001. 
Since 2001, each year, at least one Turkish firm began to function in the neighbor 
country. The reason might be the Agreement on Bilateral Encouragement of 
Investment, which is signed in 200023. As shares show, in 2002, capital export to 
Greece increased dramatically while the total capital exports decrease. This increase 
in the share might be due to cooperation on natural gas and electricity, which was 
agreed in the same year (Hürriyet, 13.03.2002). Even though this may not have a 
direct effect on investment initiatives, bilateral trust on each other’s commitment for 
further cooperation might have increased. Meanwhile, in 2004, number of capital 
exports to Greece peaked.  This significant change may be the fruit of agreement in 
2000 on encouragement of investment and further commitment for more connected 
nations. This increasing Turkish incentive to operate Turkish capital in Greece is the 
signal of increasing Turkish trust to Greece and its economy; and also increasing 
friendship in economic relations.  
 Besides the dialogue at governmental level, which resulted in many 
cooperation agreements, non-governmental initiatives also have significant role in 
transformation of the two countries’ investment incentives, notably the dialogue 
among businessmen. In 2005, Greek and Turkish Chambers of Commerce agreed to 
form a Greek-Turkish bank (Milliyet, 02.07.2005). In the meantime, formal 
initiatives continued and in the same year, the two countries’ prime ministers laid the 
foundation of Greek-Turkish natural gas pipeline (Hürriyet, 03.07.2005).  This 
appears to be an important area of cooperation on which the two countries may work 
together. Working together for the common good increases bilateral trust and leads 
the two states to further initiatives. As a process in banking sector, in 2007, Greece 
                     
23
 For more information about the agreement see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
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led national bank of Turkey, Ziraat Bank, open a branch in Greece (Hürriyet, 
04.07.2007). This, I argue, is the signal of increasing trust.  
Therefore, bilateral investments of Greece and Turkey show that there has 
been vivacity in the economic relations. The trust of both states in each other’s 
economy seems to increase. Thus, current investment relations of Greece and Turkey 
may be a reflection of an affirmative transformation in the two countries’ economic 
relations. 
 
 
3.2.3. Tourism 
 
This section analyzes the transformation of Greco-Turkish relations in the 
tourism sector. This indicator illustrates not only economic relations but also civilian 
dialogue between the two nations. Regarding economic relations, tourism is a 
competitive area for any neighboring states. Thus, any initiative to accelerate tourist 
activities toward each other signals that these two countries have willingness to 
achieve better economic relations. Furthermore, tourism also has a civilian aspect. 
Increase in exchange of civilians between two states reflects two nations’ willingness 
to know each other. If the tourist exchange increases between the two countries, 
which was used to be unsympathetic to each other, that is a good indicator of 
members of these nations beginning to trust each other and the curiosity about each 
other’s people and culture.  This would consequently soften the antagonistic and 
prejudiced views about one another. 
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In order to analyze any transformation in bilateral tourism, I evaluate two 
indicators;  
1) Number of arriving visitors from Greece; and  
2) Departing Turkish citizens to Greece.  
 
 Table 8 below shows the arriving visitors to Turkey from Greece. Even 
though the data is available from 2000 to 2005, any change within these years may 
give clues about any transformation in their tourism relations. 
 
Table 8. Arriving Visitors from Greece24 
 
 
 
Table 8 indicates that the number of Greek citizens visiting Turkey has been 
increasing since 2001. This fact might be the result of tourism cooperation 
agreements and dialogue between the two countries’ tourism ministries. In 2000, the 
two countries signed many agreements serving for the encouragement of tourism 
dialogue, which is Cooperation Agreement on Tourism, Agreement on Cultural 
Cooperation and Agreement on Sea Transportation.25 However, the lack of data for 
                     
24
 Statistics were retreived from http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=320 in 
16.05.2007 
 
25
 For more information see http://www.mfa.gov.tr 
Year 
Total 
Visitors 
Visitors from 
Greece 
Share of arriving visitors 
from Greece within the total 
arrivals 
2000 10 428 153         218 092 2,09% 
2001 11 619 909         189 028 1,62% 
2002 13 248 176         279 751 2,11% 
2003 13 956 405         393 399 2,81% 
2004  17 548 384         491 300 2,79% 
2005 21 124 886         584 784 2,76% 
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the period before 2000 restricts the comparisons between years and unable my 
analysis to realize the effectiveness of these cooperation agreements. Still, they 
appear as a stimulating factor for the increasing number of Greek visitors in Turkey. 
The figure below, which shows the share of arriving visitors from Greece within total 
foreign visitors, also illustrates this increase in arriving visitors from Greece. 
 
Figure  4. Share of Arriving visitors from Greece within total foreign visitors 
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Figure 4 illustrates that there has been a considerable increase in the number 
of visitors coming from Greece since 2001. Except a decrease in 2001, the share of 
Greek visitors continued to grow until 2003 as the share peaked. However, after 
2003, the share of Greek visitors slightly decreased. Possible reasons might be the 
insufficient number of touristic and cultural activities arranged by both sides’ 
ministries of tourism or insufficient use of sea transportation, which, I argue, might 
increase the frequency of tourist exchange. On the other hand, increased tension over 
the Aegean might be another reason of this decrease. 
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The second indicator is the departures to Greece from Turkey. Table 9 below 
shows the numbers of departures to Greece and its share within the total number of 
departures. 
 
Table 9. Departing Turkish Citizens26 
 
 
Similar to the arriving visitors from Greece, since 2001 there has been an 
increase in the number of departures from Turkey to Greece. This might be due to 
the fruitfulness of cooperation agreements of 2000. These increasing numbers 
illustrate the increasing trust and friendship of Turkish citizens to Greece and interest 
to the neighboring country. Meanwhile, the figure below shows the changes in share 
of departing citizens to Greece within the total departures abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
26
 Statistics were retreived from  http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=321 in 
16.05.2007 
Departing 
citizens Total Departures 
Departures To 
Greece 
Share of departing citizens to 
Greece within the total 
departures 
2000 9 991 004 225 123 2,25% 
2001 11 276 531 169 203 1,50% 
2002 12 921 982 245 484 1,89% 
2003 13 701 419 382 990 2,79% 
2004 17 202 996 473 559 2,75% 
2005 20 522 621 566 194 2,75% 
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Figure 5. Share of Departing citizens to Greece within the total departures 
abroad 
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Figure 5 illustrates that, since 2001, share of departures to Greece never 
declined. It should be noted that this decrease in the share might be due to the 2001 
financial crisis in Turkey. It can be noticed that in 2003 share of visits peaked and 
since then followed the same trend as the arrivals from Greece. The reason of this 
slight decrease after 2003 might be due to the lack of adequate initiatives as 
mentioned for arriving visitors from Greece. I argue that strict visa requirements are 
another barrier for the frequency of bilateral tourist exchange, notably for Turkish 
tourists. Bahar Rumelili (2005: 27) argues that Schengen visa requirements of the EU 
increase the difficulty of getting visas and restrict tourist exchange between Greece 
and Turkey. Also, I argue that insufficient use of sea transportation restricts the 
growth of tourist exchange between the two neighbors. Citizens are compelled to 
travel by plane, which is a more expensive way of transportation. Thus, I argue that 
more facility of sea transportation connecting two shores of the Aegean might 
increase the vivacity of the Aegean tourism.  
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In recent years, initiatives from the two shores of the Aegean considerably 
increased. I argue that the stable trend after 2003, which can be seen in Figure 5, 
might have a triggering affect on both Greece and Turkey to increase their dialogue, 
in the following years, on tourism in order to increase bilateral tourism. In 2005, 
Greek and Turkish mayors of the Northern Aegean district met to increase dialogue 
between the Turkish western coast and the Greek islands (Hürriyet, 21.03.2005). 
Commitment for cooperation made both countries take further steps to go beyond the 
status quo.  As Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, tourist exchange experienced a slight 
decrease after 2003. It can be argued that this situation made Greece and Turkey take 
further steps. That is why, in 2006, the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Tourism 
agreed to increase boat lines and uniting the two countries by means of sea 
transportation (Hürriyet, 12.11.2006). In 2007, visa-free tours to Greek islands from 
Turkey were initiated (Radikal, 02.08.2007).  
 In conclusion, this empirical analysis of the military and economic 
transformation in Greco-Turkish relations shows that Greece and Turkey experience 
a transformation in both areas, although there are fluctuations from time to time. 
Moreover, my news survey illustrated that both formal and informal elites work 
together to reach further cooperation. More cooperation lead them to take further 
steps and to commit as happened with the decrease of hostility levels as well as the 
increase in trade, investment and tourism activities.  
Parallel to the collaboration on economic activities, the political and military 
relations experienced a transformation. Military staff has entered a dialogue, which 
was virtually non-existent for many decades. Political cycles, while initiating or 
accelerating economic dialogue, are now more committed to cooperation. Thus, it 
appears that cooperation on the areas of low politics spread to political and security 
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areas.  Even though the significant territorial issues have not yet been solved, there 
has been a strong initiative from both sides to prevent anything, which can hinder the 
ongoing improvement in bilateral relations. Consequently, mutual trust and 
commitment is built and this leads Greece and Turkey to initiate dialogue in the most 
conflictual issues as well.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the presence and direction of 
transformation in Greco-Turkish relations after 1999, notably on military and 
economic aspects. My empirical analyses compared the periods before and after 
1999 and showed that Greece and Turkey indeed experience a transformation in their 
economic and military relations. The research also covered a political trend between 
the Greek and Turkish governments; the political cycles in both states are quite eager 
for political dialogue. Even though the main disputes on territorial issues such as the 
Aegean airspace violations and Cyprus have not yet been solved, a process has 
started and this is encouraging for further cooperation.   
The review of the abundant literature on Greco-Turkish relations show two 
strands, one rooting for an affirmative transformation of relations; another arguing 
against the presence of such change in relations. Extensive military spending of 
Greece and Turkey was shown by counter-transitionists as evidence for strained 
relations while various studies supported the presence of a thaw in bilateral relations, 
no matter how fragile the rapprochement is.  
 The empirical chapter of this thesis aimed to see whether a trend of 
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transformation really existed as one strand of the literature argued. The first finding 
is that since 1999, Greece and Turkey experience military rapprochement to a certain 
degree, although not very dramatic. Despite the increasing dialogue between the two 
countries’ military staff and political elites, the Aegean problems seem to stand as a 
barrier against perfect military thaw between Greece and Turkey creating tension 
over Aegean.  
The second finding is with regard to economic relations: Greece and Turkey 
experience an affirmative transformation in their economic relations. The positive 
trend in economic relations is especially noteworthy in the recent years. While 
bilateral trade between Greece and Turkey increased since 1999, its share within total 
trade remains limited. Having explained various reasons of this trend such as 
competitiveness of neighboring states with similar products, I resolve that bilateral 
trade may not be the best indicator to evaluate the two countries’ economic relations. 
Better indicators such as investment shares and touristic relations display a 
significant increase since 1999. Meanwhile, my analysis supports the notion that the 
two countries’ economic activities are not severally affected from political tensions. 
Serious political and military tensions harm basic economic activities to some extend 
but does not end them. Therefore, I conclude that empirical evidence indicates that 
Greece and Turkey recently experience a transformation in their economic relations. 
Meanwhile, my analysis also supports the literature, which argues that the EU 
has an important reference point for the recent Greco-Turkish military and economic 
relations. The first striking effect is through a carrot/stick policy. Greek plans to 
catch the last stage of Euro-zone and Turkey’s ambition to be part of the EU made 
the two countries refrain from any attempt to deteriorate relations with one another, 
which consequently led to decrease in the hostility levels of the two countries, 
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notably of Turkey following the Helsinki Summit in 1999.  
The second effect of EU is through strengthening the civic dialogue and 
funding civil society activities between the two countries by means of common 
projects, which led to an increase civil and business dialogue, and thus an 
improvement in economic activities.   This research contributes to the existing 
literature by providing further empirical evidence that shows a transformation in 
these areas, which are indeed taking place. 
Moreover, my analysis showed that Greece and Turkey also initiated 
significant developments, which may provide sustainable cooperation in their 
relations. There has been considerable progress in the two countries’ relations 
notably on issues of low-politics. Beside this collaboration on areas concerning low-
politics as cooperation agreements on tourism, terrorism, trade, environment, 
investment, and so forth, Greece and Turkey also initiated regional cooperation 
projects. The striking ones are the common project of constructing natural gas 
pipeline going through Western Europe via Turkey and Greece and the Balkan 
Cultures Corridor, which can gradually increase commitments and more importantly 
confidence towards one another. These projects and future projects like these, I 
argue, will make the two countries work for common goods and interests; and over 
time connect the two states more.  
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